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COUNTRY Germany (Soviet Zone)/  
Czechoslovakia

50X1-HUM

SUBJECT Comments on Iron Curtain Subjects DATE 15 July 1953

PLACE ACQUIRED by Expert Analyst

Supplement to:

Responsive to:

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1. [redacted] Soviet domestic reaction to the riots in Germany and Czechoslovakia. It took the ruling troika several days to put it in scene (this delay is not unusual). On 21 June [1953] it started: from Leningrad to Vladivostock, from Minsk to Samarkand, workers' meeting after workers' meeting with turner Ivanov, foreman Sergyenko or woman leader of shock workers Bobokalonova sending their brotherly greetings to the workers of Berlin and Magdeburg who had held high the banner of socialist unity and so heroically withstood the tempter (the American capitalist hireling and provocateur), not allowing themselves to be provoked.

2. "It all was a vast hocuspocus, an attempt to revive Communist ideology in two realms of thought in which it may retain a hold upon many people: (a) the idea of international workers' solidarity, (b) the hope of holding the empire, or as they like to think: the socialist commonwealth, together.

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3. "Very skillfully the many hundred speakers toned down attacks on America, although the denunciation of western, capitalist agents normally would have called for the usual vituperations. The way this campaign was orchestrated as a broad popular movement shows that the party still has great flexibility and that its appeal can still be effective, especially when it blends with empire interests. The strategic idea behind it must have been to channel the consternation and excitement over the uprisings into the right direction.
  
4. "Also of current interest is Soviet domestic reaction to the new economic 'liberalism' in satellite countries. The report in the 8 Jul 53 NEW YORK TIMES about consumer goods promised to the Ukraine smacks slightly of the new Hungarian Premier's medicine. It is the first definite indication that events in satellite countries have direct repercussions inside the USSR. Incidentally, it also confirms [ ] that the supply situation is 50X1-HUM much worse than generally believed. Imagine the rich Ukraine with its food surpluses, its textile industries and manufactures of all kinds being desperately short of household goods... Without massive deliveries from satellite countries trouble might have broken out even under Stalin.
  
5. "Keep an eye on Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. In Bulgaria where the regime was especially brutal and violent, it is time for a break. In Czechoslovakia Premier Siroky probably will be replaced by [ ] Jaromir Dolansky 50X1-HUM who already has advanced to first deputy premier.
  
6. [ ] as far as the Beria situation and the events developing from 50X1-HUM it are concerned, Kruglov is the key person. [ ] 50X1-HUM Kruglov was the Chief of Stalin's personal guard at Yalta. Actually, [ ] know little about him as a character. The story that he is a friend of Molotov is chit-chat, of course. There are no friendships among Communist hierarchs. The difference in age, moreover, speaks against it. Le fait massue which should be emphasized is his treachery toward Beria. That is important because it gives us a key to further events. There are no loyalties left. The regime will fall through treachery. In Kruglov's case [ ] He was Beria's first deputy. If the first deputy of 50X1-HUM a minister becomes his successor and the minister himself is locked up, the case is clear. Even more so if minister and deputy were in command of armed forces.
  
7. "[ ] little is changed as far as [ Soviet ] foreign policies are con- 50X1-HUM cerned. Domestically in the USSR the two big questions are (1) how will the non-Russians be treated; (2) will the tough policy in the villages be continued? A return to loud and militant Great-Russianism is [ ] out 50X1-HUM of the question since there has been too much trouble with the non-Russians. Brutal repression and Russification under present circumstances appear quite unlikely. But there will be a retreat from the Beria policy. How else could the purge of Beria's men be justified ideologically? The most interesting item right now [ mid Jul 53 ] is Georgia. The congress of the Georgian Communist Party which Beria's friends had called for May 25 never has taken place. Why? What about Rukhadze, the one-time Minister of State Security, who together with Ryumin was accused by Beria of having fabricated cases of 50X1-HUM non-existent nationalism? [ ] they had, under Ignatiev, fabricated a case of 'non-existent nationalism' against Beria...What about the falsification of history about which the Kremlin complained only a few weeks ago, viz the line that it had been a boon for the non-Russians to be taken over by the Russia of the Czars? [ ] the pro-Russian history books now will remain on th 50X1-HUM curriculum. Wait and see.

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8. "The same applies to agricultural policy. That measures are being devised to improve living conditions for the city populations is certain. Beria was already k. o. when the Ukrainian Central Committee adopted its resolution. More consumer goods will have to be produced. But what about the food situation?  this situation will be 'solved', as in the 50X1-HUM past, at the expense of the peasants and the satellites. Passages in the PRAVDA article of 10 Jul 53 point in that direction."

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